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“We have come to a clear realization of the fact 
that true individual freedom cannot exist without econo-
mic security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are not 
free men’. People who are hungry and out of a job are the 
stuff of which dictatorships are made. 
In our day these economic truths have become 
accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a 
second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security 
and prosperity can be established for all regard-less of 
station, race, or creed”.  
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Messa-
ge to Congress, January 11, 1944. 
 
1. A comprehensive theory of global constitutional rights must give 
an answer to a set of related issues. Which theory or conception of rights best 
explains the global model of constitutional rights? This will include 
questions of which values are protected and what their limits are? How does 
the judicial enforcement of a particular theory or conception of rights relate 
to the values of democracy? How does it interact with the institution-nal 
competence of courts, on the one hand, and with the elected political bodies, 
on the other? This is particularly important with regard to the value of the 
separation of powers. Here we can observe a “polyvalence of discourses” 
and a certain degree of “ambiguity” and “epistemic uncer-tainty”.  
Furthermore, the conception of rights which results in the imposition 
of negative obligations on the state, the traditional conception of rights 
constructed as defensive barriers or walls against the state, is seen today as 
having been “re-defined” by the growing recognition of  economic and social 
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rights. These are rights that tend to be exercised not against the state, and 
other public authorities, but, above all, through the state; in brief, rights that 
guarantee the preconditions required for autonomy, both personal and 
collective. 
The global model of constitutional rights follows a selective and 
fragmented procedure, which tends to dissociate the traditional functions of 
the market (circulation and redistribution). This separates economic liber-
ties ─ classically, property rights, and freedom of contract and commerce ─ 
from the gradual implementation of social rights, whose evolution is 
necessarily slower and discontinuous.  
Therefore, the question is how to ensure and promote at the trans-
national level the values of autonomy, equality and democracy. This takes 
place in the context of a constitutional theory which necessarily involves the 
three branches of government, although it is actuated at a transnational and 
global level, separating the sources of legitimacy, which remain linked to 
nation states, from the normative processes of validation situated at 
transnational or global levels.  
In addition, the global model of constitutional rights is largely a 
creation of the Judiciary. This is an assertion that requires, specifically in the 
context of social rights, better coordination of international economic 
policies that must be integrated by the different actors and subjects in-volved, 
and an effective coordination between different states and actors, public and 
private, within the institutional framework of global governance. 
 
2. The expansion of constitutional rights in the post-1945 era, and, in 
particular, the establishment of the European social model, is founded on the 
concept of the “social state” (Sozialstaat). It is this concept that cons-tructs 
the rules and gives expression to the concept of social citizenship. This is a 
concept by which public institutions assume positive duties for ensuring 
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social welfare, including the rights of citizenship, that must ne-cessarily 
respect the normative principles of equal consideration and res-pect, as well 
as security and legal certainty, actuated by an impartial due and fair process 
of law.  
The concept of welfare state has two dimensions: political and 
normative. The normative dimension is reflected in the circumstance that the 
rules and policies that do not respect constitutional rights, including so-cial 
rights, may potentially be reviewed by national and international courts. This 
is in the context of Europe, the Court of Justice of the Euro-pean Union 
(CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of “economic constitution” over “po-
litical constitution” creates a disparity between “Economic Constitutional 
Law” and “Social Constitutional Law”. This is a disparity that is an un-
known at the national constitutional level and which bestows to the 
considerations of economic and social policy an equal constitutional status 
in the field of political discourse and deliberations. 
Furthermore, austerity programs address towards the peripheral 
countries in the Euro zone, negotiated with the “Troika”, together with the 
strict conditionality of assistance aid, provided as a preventive arm of the 
European Stability and Growth Pact, are now interpreted in the light of a 
neoliberal economic model. This is a model that imposes quasi-objective, 
that is, quantitative, references, entrusted to intergovernmental bodies “out-
side” the institutional framework of the European Union1.  
                                                            
1 In this respect, should be consulted the ruling of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, November 27, 2012, Thomas Pringle case: www.curia.eu/juris/docu-
ment. For further reading, see also KAARLO TUORI and KLAUS TUORI, The Euro 
Zone Crisis. The Constitutional Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, 
Part II, entitled “The constitutional mutation”. 
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Yet in a time of economic and social crisis the relationship between 
constitutional rights and the structure of political power is reversed. The 
government will have more powers and the people fewer rights2. This ap-
plies not only in the context of the territorial state unit, the traditional po-
wers of the state, but also, markedly, in the framework of global economic 
and financial powers, which escape democratic control of legitimacy, trans-
parency and accountability. 
For this reason, the state loses legitimacy and its power of command 
is weakened. Many prominent authors advocate that it is increasingly diffi-
cult for the state to protect and enforce constitutional rights in the context of 
previously defined territorial units. In a global and transnational econo-my 
this new context tends to reduce the authority of the state. And this loss of 
authority leads, in turn, to a loss of democratic accountability which 
translates, ultimately, into a loss of popular support and confidence.  
This is not to mention that rights presuppose an increasing degree of 
universality, legal uniformity and abstraction. And these factors can, like-
wise, be defined in the global legal order. 
 
3. The European Union Treaty (1993) established, for the first time,  
“de iure” full citizenship within the Union. This attribution and recognition 
of legal and political rights, “beyond” the state, indicates a rupture of the 
direct link between the state and its citizens. It also explains why there may 
not exist a logical link between the “community of citizens”, on the one hand, 
                                                            
2 CLINTON L. ROSSITER, Constitutional Dictatorship. Crisis Government in 
Modern Democracies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, p. 5. 
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and the “community of sentiment” on the other, within a delimited territorial 
unit, the traditional or classical Westphalian state3. 
A number of factors explain this growth of supranational citizenship 
rights in a context of a “post-national constellation”4. This process is not 
unique to Western Europe, since the expansion of the “post-national” mo-
del is activated as transnational norms and human rights discourse permea-
te the limits of the nation state. 
In this process the national identities are altered so that they can con-
tain more and more supranational elements. National identity undergoes a 
transformative process in relation to both the “community of sentiment” and 
the “community of citizens”. This is an element that is neither in oppo-sition 
to nor in conflict with national identity, even if it provokes a trans-formation 
of the concept of “citizenship”, which evolves from a more “plu-ralistic” 
nation-based model to a more “universalist” one based on the indi-vidual as 
a person5. 
In this transformative process it is not the nation itself which is under 
pressure to establish a claim to substitute national communities of origin. 
Rather it is the content of the nation that is transformed to incorporate new 
                                                            
3 GEORG SØRENSEN, The Transformation of the State: Beyond theMyth of 
Retreat (translated to Spanish “La transformación del Estado. Más allá del mito del 
repligue”), Valencia, 2010, pp. 106 ff. On the concept of “constitutive community”, 
which included the “communities of memory”, see also DANIEL BELL, Communita-
rianism and Its Critics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
4 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1998. 
5 CRISTINA QUEIROZ, Direito Constitucional Internacional, 2nd ed., Lisboa: 
Petrony, 2016, pp. 106 ff. 
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elements, understood as a clear commitment to a closer and more perfect 
cooperation at supranational, European, and international levels6. 
 
4. The Constitution is not only a juridical instrument but a social and 
political covenant, a portentous instrument of social integration. For this 
reason the “new” methodology proposed by the “Ius Publicum Europa-
eum”, and in particular by Armin v. Bogdandy7, Director of the Max-Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, de-parts from 
the unidimensional and introspective model of the old Staats-recht. This new 
school of legal thought, which is inserted as a “third way” between the 
“classical” methodology of the State Theory (Staatsrecht) and the 
Constitutional Theory (Verfassungsrecht), does not vindicate nor use the 
homogeneous concepts of “domination” (Herrschaft), and, neither does it 
vindicate nor use the homogeneous concepts of, among others, sove-reignty, 
order and command. Instead it is essentially posited as interdis-ciplinary, 
multi-jurisdictional, comparative and post-national. 
As a consequence, even if we can discern an analogous concept of 
constitutional rights in the context of a multi-dimensional, multi-spatial and 
multi-temporal adjudication of constitutional rights, and although these 
concepts may appear similar, the objectives regarding the enforcement of 
these rights may be different and even opposite. And last but not least, we 
can observe the perils of an epistemic ambiguity and uncertainty, including 
the perception of opposite results. 
 
                                                            
6 Ibid. 
7 ARMIN v. BOGDANDY, et al (eds.), Ius Publicum Europaeum, Heidelberg: 
C. F. Müller, 2007-2016, 6 vols. 
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5. As stated above, the conception of rights that translates into the 
imposition of negative obligations on the state, that is to say the traditional 
conception of rights constructed as barriers or walls against the state, is seen 
today as “re-defined” by the growing recognition of economic and social 
rights. 
Hence the contradictory effects of the integration process at global, 
European and national levels, that can vary according to the nature of a 
manifold range of organizations, institutions and actors involved. Further-
more, International Law, and in particular International Human Rights Law, 
risks destabilizing national legal systems without being in a position to offer 
them a transnational and effective legal order enforced by the courts. 
The question is how to guarantee and promote, at transnational and 
global levels, the values of autonomy, equality and democracy in the frame 
of a Constitutional Theory that involves the three branches of Government 
─ legislative, executive and judicial powers. 
This is particularly true in the context of social rights which require 
effective coordination of international economic policies, i.e., a set of ac-
tions that integrate different actors; a better coordination and collaboration 
among the different states and other actors, public and private, within the 
structures of global governance institutions. 
Against this background, the expansion of constitutional rights ob-
served in the post-1945 period, and in particular the establishment of the 
European social model, cannot  be based exclusively upon the concept of 
“social state” (Sozialstaat). This is a concept of social state in which public 
authorities assume responsibility for ensuring social welfare, including citi-
zenship, and fully respect the normative principles of “equal consideration” 
and “respect”, “security” and “legal certainty”, enacted through a due and 
fair process of law.  
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We can here observe a process of asynchrony and asymmetry bet-
ween the development of juridification and democratization, on the one 
hand, and mechanisms of individual self-determination and democracy, on 
the other. This asynchrony and asymmetry is well illustrated through the 
course of European integration.  
 
6. Europe and European Union are witnessing a continuous process of 
“constitutionalization” of rights; a selective and differentiated process, of a 
simultaneously multi-dimensional, multi-spatial and multi-temporal nature; 
a process that ends up attributing prevalence to the “economic constitution” 
to the detriment of the “political constitution”.  
The “triple crisis”, a crisis that is the cumulative outcome of a finan-
cial market crisis, a sovereign debt crisis of the European Union and its Euro 
zone, and of economic growth, made it clear that the European order, based 
on an idea of balance and concert among European states, was not built on 
sound foundations. The market principle, with an Ordo-liberal resonance, 
superseded the Kantian and cosmopolitan vision of democratic self-
determination. Europe, quite simply, is stuck in an “elite’s project”, more 
managerial and functionalist than Kantian and cosmopolitan8. 
The emancipatory potential of the Kantian and cosmopolitan vision, 
on the contrary, includes a principle of sociability, which is an integral part 
of the affirmation of the democratic principle. It also implies the prevalence 
and primacy of the political constitution over the economic constitution 
rather than a “neutralization” of the political constitution by the economic 
constitution, subjecting the former to a constitutional soft law.  
                                                            
8 CRISTINA QUEIROZ, As múltiplas faces da Europa, in: CRISTINA QUEI-
ROZ, “Direito, Estado e Constituição no limiar do século XXI”, Coimbra: Coimbra 
Editora, 2015, p. 56. 
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And, in fact, Europe has multiple faces. But it cannot fall into the 
“illusion” of the primacy of the market, of “output legitimacy”9, to the 
detriment of the principles of the Rule of Law and Democracy. The “reserve” 
of power lies with the democratic constitution, never with the economic 
constitution based on market principles and free competition. And it is 
precisely in time of economic and social crisis that rights most need 
protection and guarantees, from and through the state and other public 
institutions. 
Hence the importance of universal human rights and the principles of 
equality and justice. And the problem is precisely this:  how to govern a 
country effectively and civilly in the context of a “state of permanent 
emergency” not foreseen or authorized in accordance with constitutional 
clauses and provisions, including at European and international level.  
Surely a hard case. However, we must keep the hope that it won’t 
become tragic. 
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